A Neglected Factor of War



Like the other referential principles of the social sciences of today, the principle of causality is in a chaotic state. We use it all the time as something definite and clear in its meaning, but as soon as we begin to analyze it, we find its meaning is neither definite, nor identical among various scholars. When we take a concrete problem and start to analyze its causes, this chaotic state becomes immediately apparent. The problem of the causes of war illustrates this lack of precision. The existing literature on war causation reveals the almost hopelessly muddled condition of our knowledge in this field, and in that of causality generally. We find in this literature, first, an almost unbelievable diversity of causes set forth by different, and sometimes even by the same, investigators. The causal factors evoked include: sunspots, climate, conjunctions of planets, and other cosmic factors; instincts of pugnacity, of war, of fighting, of herd and of aggressiveness; overpopulation, underpopulation, high and low birth and mortality rates; universal law of struggle for existence, and other biological factors; fear, fight for freedom, relaxation from inhibitions imposed by civilization, sadism, lust for power, ostentation, vanity, and dozens of other psychological forces; a long list of economic, political, dynastic, religious, aesthetic, educational, and other social factors; diverse cultural conditions like "the true and false culture," mores, and the like; philosophical abstractions like Destiny, Providence, and so on; and finally, various "wicked," great- and small-men and groups.


This enormous diversity of the causes is sufficient evidence of a lack of a real knowledge of the problem.What would we say if such an agglomeration of diverse causes were listed, let us say, for diphtheria, or for the birth of a child? Sir Austin Chamberlain aptly summarizes the situation when he says:

"I wonder what you think of them (the diverse theories)? Have they left a clear picture on your mind? Do you feel that you can now be up and doing, that your doubts are removed and that the way to peace stands clear before you? If so, you are more fortunate or much cleverer than I. It may be that in the multitude of the counsellors there is wisdom, but there is certainly no agreement amid these discordant voices."

This depressing situation is aggravated by many additional sins. One of these is the internal inconsistency of many of the theories offered. For instance, many of these claim that the main cause of war is economic: "to keep what we have got and to take more,"[3] or "the Imperialist rivalries stirred by our present economic system,"[4] and the like. And then the same authors assure us that "war does not pay," that the conquerors and the conquered like usually lose economically. Unless we assume an absolute stupidity and untouchability of all the peoples, these two statements, that the cause of war is economic, and that war does not pay, are hard to reconcile. The assumption of absolute stupidity is hardly sound. Therefore, either the cause is indicated incorrectly, or it is false that war never pays.

Still more clearly does such a self-contradiction stand out when we confront the causal diagnosis and the cures of war offered by the same author. For instance, Aldous Huxley regards as the causes: geography, climate, racial and economic factors, boredom, passions, nationalism, fear, and wicked men; in brief, a number of deep forces, some of which do not depend upon human control. In spite of this, he does not hesitate to offer as the cure for war such measures as: "psychoanalysing our politicians and newspaper proprietors," "abolition of boredom," and, of course, united propaganda against war.' If his causes of war are real, then evidently the means suggested to prevent or abolish it do not touch most of these causes, and therefore have to be impotent; if they are effective, then evidently the causal diagnosis is wrong. Similarly, G. D. H. Cole regards economic imperialism and rivalry in its deepest sense as the main cause of war. Yet, as the patented cure for war he suggests Socialism, without explaining how it can abolish the economic rivalries, and especially, "nationalisation of the manufacture of armaments and the complete stopping of the international trade in arms" which "would decrease the amount of military preparation in the world and make war less likely."[6] Lack of correspondence between the column of the causes and that of the cures of war is again striking. When one considers a series of magical effects ascribed to nationalization of armaments and stopping the international trade in arms, it becomes still clearer. For instance, nationalization of manufacturing of armaments in all probability would cause, not an abolition of war or its decrease, but a particularly strong development of manufacturing of armaments by the governments of all countries; stopping of international trade in arms (like some neutrality pacts) would stimulate the strong nations to become more aggressive, and would make the nations with little development of the arms industry the prey of the strong nations. In brief, instead of "making war less likely" such measures may increase the explosions, or, at any rate, can hardly decrease them. Again, if the causes are indicated adequately, then the cures cannot be effective; if the cures are valid, then the causes are fallacious. One could continue ad libitum.

Still another defect that aggravates the above sins is a most pitiable application to the study of war of the principle of so-called multiple causation. After stressing this or that particular causal factor of war, most of the authors finally rely upon some variety of multiple causation. A typical example is Dean Inge's enumeration of the factors of war: pugnacity, plus artificial stimulation, plus pressure of the population, plus machinations of the government to distract the attention from internal affairs and to stop a revolution at home, plus aggressive imperialism, plus fear, plus drive for unification, plus something else. Aldous Huxley's multiple causation is as follows: geographic and climatic conditions; racial factors; economic factors; passions; wicked great men, plus a series of psychoanalytical factors which he stresses as the most important.[8] Sir Josiah Stamp agrees that wars are caused by a "collection of conditions," among which he particularly mentions: economic penetration, economic inequality, differentiated population, and some others.[9] Professor James Ford enumerates the following elements of the multiple causation of war: economic factors, private manufacturing of armaments, dictatorships, totalitarian regimes, misguided education, mob psychology, emotionalism, wrong attitudes, ambitions, anger, avariciousness, and so on.[10] Sir Arthur Salter enumerates religious, dynastic, political, and economic causes, each consisting of several subclasses.[11] G. A. Johnston mentions specifically among many causes: social injustice, monotony of industrial life, the artificial stimulation of consumption, unemployment, etc.[12]

The slogan of multiple causation is very popular nowadays. We use it all the time as something quite definite, sound and unquestionable. As a matter of fact, the problem of multiple causation is neither clear, nor unquestionable, nor free from serious logical difficulties. Leaving these statements without further elucidation, one application of the principle used in the above formulas of the multiple causation of war needs to be mentioned specifically as particularly fallacious. It is the form in which factors which are quite incommensurable and which belong to profoundly different planes of phenomena are put together, and even side by side, under the multiple principle. Suppose we take as the formula of multiple causation the following one: universal law of struggle for existence, instinct of pugnacity and herd, fear and lust for power, existence of wicked rulers, division of mankind into different nations, the sunspots, and some religious and economic factors. One can see that these factors belong to fundamentally different planes of reality, and as such are neither commensurable, nor comparable, nor generally capable of being united into any real unity. How is it possible to compare and co-measure the role of the sun-spots and that of fear or lust; the weight of fear and that of the universal law of struggle for existence; the weight of these and of the division of mankind into nations, or of the religious factor? It is evident that they cannot be measured, or even roughly appraised in any comparative way; there is no measuring stick applicable to all of these. They can neither be put side by side nor understood properly in their fantastic adjacency or unity. The very classification of that type is one of the gravest logical errors. It is a cloak that hides a profound ignorance, a hash that prevents any understanding of the causes of war or of any other phenomenon treated in the same way. In brief, such a use of multiple causation is logically unpermissible.[13] For this reason only, the formulae of the multiple causes of war are worthless.

Furthermore, even when they are free from this error, the formulae of multiple causation do not give per se any criterion for choice of the real causes out of millions of circumstances under which a war breaks out. Suppose we take the World War as an illustration. Here are a few out of millions of attendant circumstances: shot at Sarajevo; Viscount Gray's psychology; bad influence of Rasputin upon the Czarina; economic imperialism of Germany; vast territory of Russia; low birth rate in France; Hegel's and Nietzsche's philosophy; private manufacturing of armaments in England; German "fear" of the Russian rearmament; great popular reception of President Poincare in Russia in the summer of 1941 Polish aspirations for independence; desire of the military class for elevation of its prestige; departure of Emperor Wilhelm II for a sea trip a few days before the opening of the war; supposed backward culture of Russia and her slavophil policy; heavy rain in parts of Austria in the summer of 1914. All of these conditions indeed were present immediately before and at the beginning of the war, but shall we take them all as causes, just because they were existing before and at the beginning of the war? If so, we must then consider millions of other conditions existing then as part of our multiple causation. Evidently such a catalogue is neither a causal formula, nor of any cognitive value; there is no end to the enumeration of the infinite number of the items and conditions present before and at the opening of the war, and if there were, such a list could not be remembered. If we exclude all these millions of conditions, then what reasons can we give for their exclusion, leaving only those enumerated above? We do not have any criterion for judging that the enumerated conditions are more important than those not enumerated. Even if we pass by this difficulty, the above conglomeration of the factors of our "multiple causation" is still nothing but enumeration of a few incidental conditions, chosen haphazardly or arbitrarily, mistaken for the causes. Even so, the number of the factors in the enumeration is too large and their nature is too incommensurable to be of any value as a causal formula. These remarks show why the causal formulae surveyed are logically unpermissible, factually fruitless, or, at best, represent a mere haphazard description of some of the circumstances present in one or a few wars — which description in no way is causal analysis and has practically nothing to do with it. This conclusion is reinforced still more by the fact that few, if any, of the above theories concerning the causes of war take into consideration the relevant factual material concerning war as a check on the validity of the theories. It is almost unbelievable how almost all the theories on the causes of war are completely free from any factual material concerning war and its movement. In a very few of the studies some material can be found; all the rest of the theories are practically devoid of any factual, and especially, of relevant factual, material. From this standpoint, they represent a pure and unadulterated speculation at its worst, logically incoherent, factually unchecked, unrelated to the facts generally, and therefore lacking any induction or inductive corroboration. If such a study of the relevant facts of war were made by the authors, most of the theories would never have appeared, or would be removed to a morgue at once. Why? Because they either do not solve the problem of the causes of war as an empirical phenomenon, or they are contradicted by the relevant facts. Let us take a few examples. In order that a theory of the sun-spots or climatic or other astrophysical causes of war be entitled to any consideration, it must at least show that fluctuation in the sunspots or the conjunction of the planets goes on in a tangible association (positive or negative) with the fluctuation of the war-peace periods in a given country or several countries, and with the increase and decrease of the magnitude or frequency of war phenomena. For this purpose, all such theories need a sufficient series of facts, giving the periods of peace and war, and the data of increase and decrease of war. With the exception of half fantastic theories in this field like that of K. Mewes,[14] almost all the theories do not even try to give any series of data, or even any data, about the war-peace movement. Therefore, they remain mere conjectures hanging in the air, unrelated to the facts, without any attempt at inductive testing. More than that, when they are tested, as I tried to do, no tangible association is discovered between the movement of either the sunspots or climatic or astrophysical factors and the movement of war and peace.[15] The same goes for all the theories of various instincts, prepotent reflexes, drives, residues, fear, lust for power, aggressiveness, and other instinctive or psychological forces as the causes of war. Likewise, such causes as "the universal law of the struggle for existence" fall into the same objectionable category in accounting for the presence or absence, or the magnitude of war. If any of these "factors" is assumed to be constant, then it flatly fails to explain why a given country or a universe of several countries now has peace and now has war, why war is now increasing, now declining. The alleged cause being constant, while its effect varies, the alleged cause cannot be the real cause. If any of these forces is assumed not to be constant, then the theories must explain why the force fluctuates, and that its fluctuation is tangibly parallel to the fluctuation of war-peace phenomena. Such a test has scarcely been attempted by any theories of this sort. They have hardly, if ever, gone beyond a purely dogmatic assertion, and rarely have tried to secure a minimum of the relevant facts about the movement of war and peace. Therefore, they also remain void. With slight variations these considerations bear upon most of the other theories of the causes of war. Until they all attempt to secure a modicum of the relevant facts concerning the movements of war and peace and their increase and decrease and until they account satisfactorily through their "causes" for the real movement of war and peace, they are all void and worthless. Thus, when the above fallacies of the existing theories of war causation are considered, the net result is that either we do not know any-thing real about the causes of war, or if we do know something, the theories, remaining pure conjecture, do not show it. A Neglected Factor of War. As already indicated, any serious theory in the field should have at its disposal at least a minimum of relevant data on war movement and only after testing its hypothesis on these data can the theory have any claims for validity. Following this requirement, I am going now to suggest one of the important possible factors of war which is rarely mentioned. Being strictly sociological in its nature, the factor seems to stand the logical as well as the factual test better than many factors suggested. For the sake of brevity, let us take the actual curves of the movement of war in the history of Greece, Rome, and European countries and test the validity of this theory on this factual basis. This diagram shows roughly the curve of the war movement measured by the number of the causalities per million of the population in the respective countries from century to century. It is based on a systematic study of all the wars recorded for these countries, some 967 wars. To be sure it is only a rough approximation, but under the existing state of historical knowledge about each of these wars, their casualties, and the size of the respective populations, it is possibly as accurate as any of the existing data in this field. It is probably more complete and more systematic than any such study hitherto made. All the uncertainties and shortcomings of such a study are clearly indicated in my Social and Cultural Dynamics, from which I take this curve.[16]


If one would test most of the hypotheses offered with the help of this curve, and many other more detailed curves not given here,[17] one can easily see that they do not explain even a major part of these curves. Neither climatic and astrophysical factors; nor biological factors like instinct of pugnacity and others, struggle for existence, overpopulation and under-population, race and heredity; nor psychological factors, fear, lust for power, aggressiveness, and the like; nor social factors taken singly, such as poverty and prosperity, changes in means and instruments of production, the specific size and density of population, monarchy and republic, autocracy and democracy, conservatism and liberalism, religiosity or irreligiosity, collectivism or individualism, ignorance or literacy, spirit of nationalism or internationalism; nor most of the other factors offered, can account for, or be fitted to, the greater part of the movement of war. Wars happened or did not happen, grew and declined under any of these conditions, and one can hardly find any uniform and tangible positive or negative association between the movement of war and any of these variables. Some of these factors can possibly account for several secondary movements, but not for the whole curve or even its important parts. Is there any other factor or condition which can explain the facts more satisfactorily? Such a factor seems to exist. What, then, is it? Before nam-ing it, let us assume for the sake of clarity of our analysis that there are two states or parties in interaction. As sociologists, we know that each of these states represents a web of social relationships and a system of cultural values. Their interaction means also the existence of a set of interstate social relationships and cultural values. Intragroup as well as intergroup social relationships and cultural values may be either well integrated and crystallized or unintegrated and amorphic. When they are integrated and crystallized, this means that the distribution of the rights, duties, and functions of each party are definite; each party knows what it is entitled and obliged to do in regard to the other party, and what the other party is entitled and obliged to do in regard to it. Their relationship, be it interindividual or intergroup, has definite norms as signposts, and these norms are acted upon. Similar norms, definite and clear, are present in the system of cultural values involved. For each party, they clearly indicate what in their interrelations is regarded as true and false, right and wrong, of positive and negative value, and which values are supreme and which subordinate. The unintegrated or uncrystallized status of the network of social relation-ships, interindividual or intergroup, and of the set of cultural values, means the opposite: no clear distribution of rights and duties and functions; no clearcut system of values; a state of amorphous, "anomie," and therefore discordant and conflicting claims, tastes, fancies, and preferences. Such a state occurs either when the contact of the parties is just begun and has not had time to be settled, when no "traffic rules" are as yet established, or when, for some reason or other, the previous existing crystallized system of values and relationships is upset, and shattered, i.e., when the existing traffic rules are smashed and no new ones are as yet established. It should be noted that the crystallized or uncrystallized status has only remote relationship to such qualifications as just-unjust, useful-harmful, fair-unfair, and the like. The rules in an orderly prison are hardly very pleasant to the prisoners, or welcomed by them; yet they are definite and normally are observed. The relationships between masters and slaves in the past were also clearcut and definite, though one may question their usefulness and justness for the slaves. After these reminders, I can outline what appears to me to be the necessary, if not sufficient, factor of war (and peace). Other conditions being equal, each time when in the relationship of two or more states, or of any social groups, the system of social relationships and cultural values involved tends to become shattered, or muddled, or indefinite, such a change favors the chances of war. /Ind vice versa, when the network of the relationships and cultural values moves toward greater crystallization, stability, and clear integration, such a change favors peace in their interrelationship. Such is the hypothesis in a nutshell. A few comments are not out of place. Unfolded, the hypothesis implies the following particular cases.

A. If and when, for whatever reason, the intragroup system, either of relationships or of cultural values, or both, undergoes a rapid and deep change within each party (state), such an inner "revolution" within one party tends, for obvious reasons, to unsettle the existing status quo in its relationship to the other party(ies); it therefore increases the chances of antagonism, conflict, and war between them.

B. Still later is the facilitation of the chances of war if both parties a profound, but opposite, modification of their intragroup of relationships and system of cultural values. In that case, the relations that existed between them will be doubly shattered and perturbed, and consequently lead to more conflicts and finally to war.

C. When in the interacting parties the tempo and the profoundness or magnitude of change of their organization and culture are so fast and so great that there is hardly any possibility for them to settle and crystallize, because before they have a chance to do so in regard to the latest change, it is gone and is replaced by a new one, such a tempo and magnitude of social and cultural change unsettles more and more the system of the intergroup social and cultural relationships, and greatly facilitates antagonisms, conflicts, and war. There is, of course, a theoretical possibility of a rapid change which is harmonious and orderly and which does not disrupt the crystallization of the relationships, but systematically, like a healthy growing organism, changes it from one crystallized form into another. In empirical social reality, however, such a case is exceedingly rare, practically nonexistent. Empirically, to use an analogy, the rapid tempo and magnitude of change are similar to driving a car at increasing speed on a road with increasingly sharper turns. Such driving, as we know, increases the chances of accidents. Likewise, increase of magnitude and tempo of change in one interacting party, and especially in both, increases the chances of conflict. The hypothesis, then, is sociological par excellence. It sees the necessary and immediate factor of war, not in the sunspots or other cosmic and biological factors, nor in any specific social and cultural conditions, economic, demographic, religious, psychological, or any other, but in the stable or shattered status of the whole web of social relationships and of the system of cultural values of the parties involved. It says that if the status is definite, crystallized, and stable, the chances for war are small, no matter whether or not the economic or other conditions of the parties involved are satisfactory from our standpoint. If the status of the relationships and cultural system is amorphic and unsettled, the slightest pretext is sufficient to call forth a war-explosion. The states in this respect can be compared with a car or an organism. The strong constitution of an organism, or mechanical perfection cf a car, are the best guarantee against sickness or car trouble. An old and shattered car or constitutionally weak organism are bound to have more frequent and more serious troubles than the new and well integrated car or strong organism. The slightest unfavorable condition is sufficient to call forth trouble in a dilapidated car or in a weak organism. So far as our factor consists of the status of the whole of the web of social relationships and cultural values, it is neither economic, nor political, nor demographic, but sociological by its nature. The shattered or strong status of the network of social relationships and cultural values is not identical with either war or peace, just as Durkheim's "social anomie" is not identical with suicide. For this reason, my hypothesis cannot be accused of being tautological. It indicates the connection be-tween two different phenomena: war and shattered status, peace and strongly integrated status of the social and cultural relationships. Each variable in each pair is essentially different from the other, and by no means identical, therefore by no means tautological. Such is the hypothesis. I regard the factor named as the necessary and real, though not always sufficient cause of war, in the same sense as an infection with the germs of diphtheria is the necessary and real, though not always sufficient (as when one is innoculated and is immune) cause of diphtheria. The concrete circumstances under which the infection takes place vary infinitely in regard to place, time, ways of infection, and the persons or things from which the infection is obtained. Likewise, the concrete circumstances under which a shattering of the stability of the social and cultural relationships occurs, may be very different in various conditions and societies; but the shattering remains, like infection in diphtheria, the necessary cause of war. After these remarks turn now to the diagram. In the light of the hypothesis its main ups and downs seem to be easily explainable.

I. We see that throughout the Middle Ages, with its stability and perfectly crystallized system of social and cultural relationships, and its very slow tempo and small magnitude of social and cultural change, the level of the war curve, measured by the casualties or the strength of the army per million of the population of Austria, Germany, England, and France, re-mains low up to the thirteenth century.

2. The thirteenth century marks the beginning of the transformation of Western culture from one of its fundamental forms, Ideational, to another which I have styled Sensate. It also marks the beginning of the end of the medieval-feudal system of social relationship. These great beginnings in the transformation of the social and cultural system of the Western World continued in later centuries. Correspondingly, the curve of war slowly but steadily rises from century to century until the seventeenth.

3. The sixteenth and seventeenth are the centuries when, internally, the new rising Sensate culture and a new social order reach their hegemony, clear from the ground the debris of the preceding order and culture, give the last battle to them, and begin to settle and to build a new house of culture and social order. Hence the high war curve.

4. The new culture becomes definitely settled, the feudal system entirely liquidated, and the national states clearly and definitely established. The Europe of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries was again strong and stable in its system of social order and values. Correspondingly, during these centuries the curve of war declines. This decline is especially great in the second part of the nineteenth century.

5. With the end of the nineteenth century, the dominant Sensate culture and contractual or capitalist system of social relationship begins to show first signs of shattering; and then, in ever increasing tempo of social and cultural change, it begins to be unsettled and disintegrated more and more. In the twentieth century, the tempo and the magnitude of the change becomes feverish. In this Niagara of mad flux, the intergroup social relationships and cultural values are more and more undermined, often ground to dust, atomized, and relativized to such an extent that none of the fundamental relationships and values of Victorian Europe are left intact and unbroken. This naturally leads to an earthquake in the intergroup social and cultural relationships. In turn, this has led to an explosion of antagonisms and conflicts, and, finally, to the World War and other minor wars which have blown to pieces the social order and system of values. Correspondingly, the curve of war in this century has flared up to an unprecedented height. It is the bloodiest century in the whole history of the Western World. Thus, in the light of the hypothesis, the main movements of the war curve seem to be comprehensible.

6. The same can be shown in regard to the main movements of the war curves of Greece and Rome, and, likewise, in regard to much more detailed fluctuations of war curves in separate countries, and for periods shorter than a century. Many, if not all, are in accordance with the hypothesis.[18] If the hypothesis, then, is at least as valid as any of the proposed theories of the causes of war, it permits one to say something about the present and the immediate future. This can be put in the following conditional way:

7. If the entirely unsettled contemporary system of social relationships and cultural values of the Western World remains in the future in this shattered form, or if the shattering increases still more, we should expect bigger and bloodier wars in the future. If, on the contrary, systems of both relationships and values become crystallized, stabilized, and reintegrated, no matter in which concrete form, such a reintegration will work for peace. Such is the first conditional diagnosis.

8. If the hypothesis is valid, then most of the measures suggested for elimination of war, beginning with antiwar propaganda and ending with most of the cures based on the above theories of the causes of war, and suggested by statesmen, politicians, professors, and pacifists, are not very efficient means for the desired end. Most of them scarcely touch the real and necessary cause of war. However seductive they appear to the public, they are either merely surface rubbing, or, more often, quack medicine that harms rather than improves the cause of peace. This verdict is well sustained inductively by their demonstrated impotency and futility. In spite of numberless attempts to use these "cures" by the League of Nations, and by various nations and their leaders, the medicine has not helped the patient, peace. The status of peace is far more insecure at the present time than at any time since the Great War. Such a result is eloquent experiential evidence of the fallibility of the causal as well as medicinal diagnoses. In the light of the hypothesis, the real medicine against war consists in all actions and measures that work for restabilization and reintegration of the contemporary shattered system of social relationships and cultural values. The real forces for war consist in all actions and measures that in-crease shattering and hinder reintegration of the social and cultural system, no matter for what noble or ignoble purposes. Such is the general formula of the cure against war. Being sufficiently clear in its general nature, it points out the concrete ways and forms of organized social action for decreasing or eliminating war. Enumeration of these concrete forms and measures is outside the task of this paper. 


 1 As a sample of the enormous amount of literature and theories in the field, the two following symposia may serve: H. J. Stenning (editor), The Causes of War, London, 1935. This includes articles by Dean W. R. Inge, Lord Beaverbrook, G. D. H. Cole, Sir Josiah Stamp, Sir Norman Angell, Aldous Huxley, Major Douglas, Sir Austin Chamberlain. Arthur Porritt (editor), The Causes of War, New York, 1932, includes articles by Sir Arthur Salter, Sir ArthurThompson, G. A. Johnston, A. Zimmern, C. F. Andrews, F. J. Libby, H. Atkinson, W. Steed, and others. See also H. Fielding Hall, The Nature of War and Its Causes, London, 1917; R. Hubert, Les interpretations de la guerre, Paris, 1919; G. Lowes Dickinson, War: Its Nature,Cause and Cure, New York, 1923; T. Veblen, An Inquiry into the Nature of Peace, New York,1917; Paul Lacombe, La guerre et l'homme, Paris, 1903; Tell A. Turner, Causes of War and the New Revolution, Boston, 1927; A. C. Pigou, The Political Economy of War, London, 1921;John Bakeless, The Economic Causes of Modern War, New York, 1921;Q. Wright, The Causes of War and the Conditions of Peace, London, 1935; S. R. Steinmetz, Soziologie des Krieges,Leipzig, 1929; Jules Sageret, Philosophie de la guerre et de la paix, Paris, 1919; Cf. other literature cited in P. Sorokin, Contemporary Sociological Theories, chap. 6, New York, 1928;P. Sorokin, Social and Cultural Dynamics, vol. 3, chaps. 9, 10, II, and pp. 543-577. 

2 H. S. Stenning, op. cit., 96.
3 G. L. Dickinson, op. cit., 50.
4 G. D. H. Cole, in H. J. Stenning, op. cit., 59; Sir Josiah Stamp, ibid., 83-85.
5 In Stenning's The Causes of War, 47-58.
6 Ibid., 59-62,72.
7 Dean Inge in Stenning, op. cit., 15—9.
8 Ibid., 47-58.
9 Ibid., 83-95.
10 James Ford and K. M. Ford, The ilbolition of Poverty, 259, New York, 1937.
11 Cf. Porritt, The Causes of War, 1-25.
12 Ibid., 26-62. See there many other forms of multiple causation.
13 Fear does not 'combine' with a gun to explain a case of manslaughter as wind combines with water to produce a storm at sea," R. M. Maciver indicates rightly. See his Society, a Textbook of Sociology, 476 pp., New York, 1937.
14 K. Mewes, Krieges and Geistesperioden im 17Nkerleben, Leipzig, 1922. See my criticism of it in my Social and Cultural Dynamics, vol. 3, 352 pp.
15 See P. Sorokin, Social and Cultural Dynamics, vol. 3, 352 p.; Contemporary Sociological Theories, chaps. 3 and 6.
16 See vol. 3, 259-380.
17 See these in vol. 3 of the Dynamics.
18 See the details in my Social and Cultural Dynamics, vol. 3.